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EFFECTS OF THE CHANGING TAX TREATMENT OF
CAPITAL GAINS UPON INVESTORS' BEHAVIOR
The most persistent and influential objection offered in Congress to
any except very low taxes upon capital gains is that they obstruct
and distort investment transactions. It is contended that:
1) They induce business men and investors to postpone many
potential seffing transactions for varying periods or indefinitely. The
mobility of capital and enterprise is thereby impaired.
2) They seriously weaken the incentives to make risky though
socially desirable investments: enterprise capital, the kind that is
willing to forego a relatively safe and regular income in return for a
chance for big gains, is deterred by the prospect that the tax collector
will reduce the gains to moderate proportions if they are realized at
all, and that he will make only niggardly concessions if losses are
incurred.
3) They accentuate stock market booms and collapses by discour-
aging the liquidation of over-priced securities: such liquidation
might check or moderate an unhealthy rise. If it does not take place,
both the rise and the subsequent decline are accentuated.
4) They so cut down the volume of transactions that tax revenues
are less than they would be were the rates lower.
Do the figures compiled from income tax returns provide clear-
cut evidence respecting the validity and force of these contentions?
And what light do they throw on the effects of specific changes in
tax treatment? In examining these figures we must remember that
they tell us directly, and inadequately, only what individuals did, not
why they did it. Nor can the latter always be inferred. A whole com-
plex of forces operates upon the motives and actions of investors.
The tax treatment of capital gains and losses is only one of these,
and its influence is usually inextricably interwoven with that of the
others. In drawing inferences from the figures reviewed in this chap-
ter a high degree of caution is therefore necessary.
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1ALTHOUGH IN 1917-21 EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ON LONG TERM
CAPITAL GAINS WERE THE HIGHEST IN OUR HISTORY, LARGE NET
GAINS WERE REALIZED
From 1913 through 1921 capital gains, both long and short term,
were subject in full to the ordinary income tax rates. These rates
were very low at first. In 1913-15 the maximum surtax rate was
only 6 percent, and in 1916 only 13 percent. But tax rates were
sharply raised during the war years 1917-18, and were lowered only
slightly in 1919-21. In 1918 the effective rate on an additional dol-
lar of capital gains for a married individual with 2 dependents was
77 percent if his statutory net income would otherwise be $1 miffion;
64 percent, if $100,000; 36 percent, if $50,000; 23 percent, if
$25,000; 16 percent, if $10,000; and 7 percent, if $5,000. For long
term gains these rates were the highest in our history until 1942,
when they were exceeded for income levels below about $30,000
but not for those above (Chart 24 and Table 87).
Although capital gains were fully taxable, capital losses were not
at first fully deductible. In 19 13-15 they were not deductible at all,
Chart24
Effective Tax Rate on an Additional Dollar of Long Term Capital Gains
Individuals at 6 Levels of Statutory Net Income, 1917—1950
In 1934-37, assumes assets had been held 2-5 years.
In ossumes a return.
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and in 19 16-17 they were deductible only up to the amount of capi-
tal gains realized by the taxpayer. But in 1918-21 they were deducti-
ble against income of any kind.
The amounts of net capital gains and losses reported by individ-
uals with net incomes under the 1917-21 tax treatment varied
widely in the different years. Despite full taxability at the high regu-
lar income tax rates then in force, net capital gains in 1919 and
again in 1920, doubtless reflecting the postwar boom, were among
the 15 largest in 19 17-46 (Table 1). Net gains reported for 1917,
1918, and 1921, on the other hand, were among the 5lowestin
the 30 years. Net capital losses were similarly irregular. The amounts
in 1920 and 1921 were among the 9 largest in the 30 years, reflecting
the crisis and'depression of 1920-21, but in 1918, when net losses
were just as fully deductible, the amount was among the 4 lowest.
In the uppermost income groups, however, there is evidence that
the high tax rates discouraged the realization of capital gains. First,
capital gains constituted a strikingly smaller proportion of incomes
of $100,000 or more in 1917-21 than in any subsequent year (Table
5). Further, in 1917-21 they were only about the same proportion
of the largest incomes as of all incomes, whereas in the other years
they consistently accounted for a conspicuously bigger fraction of
very large incomes than of smaller. Finally, in 1922, the first year in
which a 12½ percent maximum tax was set on net long term capital
gains, the aggregate amount realized by those with net incomes of
$100,000 or more jumped very much more than the total realized
by those in the other income groups. The rise in the former was
about 2,400 percent; in the latter, 70 percent; and the contribution
of capital gains to net income rose from less than 2 to about 25
percent for the former, but only from 2 to less than 4 percent for the
latter (Tables 2 and 41).'
2 BIG CUTS IN EFFECTIVE TAX RATES IN 1922-3 3 WERE FOLLOWED
BY BOTH THE FATTEST AND LEANEST YEARS OF CAPITAL GAINS
AND OF TAX REVENUES
In response to contentions that the taxation of capital gains at ordi-
nary income tax rates was obstructing investment transactions and
that it was unfair to tax such gains as if they arose solely in the
year of realization, Congress, in the Revenue Act of 1921, placed
'The comparisons between different years are not perfectly accurate because
changes in the law and in tabulation practices affected the figures in some
degree. But little of the pronounced contrasts cited here can be attributed to
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anupper limit of 12½ percent upon tax rates applicable to net cap-
ital gains from assets held more than 2 years. This ceiling remained
in force until the end of 1933.2 During this period anyone whose
long term gains would be subject to a higher rate if treated as ordi-
nary income was permitted to pay a flat tax of 12½ percent on them
in lieu of including them in his ordinary income tax computation.
Those with net incomes of less than an amount that varied between
about $16,000 and $32,000 in different years continued to be taxed
at ordinary income tax rates on their long term net gains, and all
taxpayers were so liable on gains from assets held 2 years or less.
Although the upper income groups alone benefited from the 12½
percent ceiling rate on long term capital gains, all taxpayers with
capital gains benefited from the successive reductions in normal
and surtax rates during the 'twenties. For the upper income groups
these reductions lowered the effective rates on short term capital
gains, and for other taxpayers, on both short and long term. For a
married individual with two dependents and a statutory net income
of $1 miffion, the effective rate on an additional dollar of short term
capital gains was reduced from 73 percent in 1921 to 25 percent by
1925; if the statutory net income was $100,000, the reduction was
from 60 to 25 percent; if the statutory net income was $50,000,
from 32 to 18 percent; if the statutory net income was $25,000, from
19 to 12 percent. The rate for both short and long term gains was
cut for those with smaller incomes: from 12 to 4 percent if the
statutory net income was $10,000, and from 5 to 1.5 percent, if
$5,000 (Chart 25 and Table 87).
Several years after the adoption of the 12½ percent ceiling rate
on long term capital gains and after several successive reductions in
normal and surtaxes, an unprecedented stock market boom devel-
oped in the United States, and the totals of net capital gains realized
and of tax revenues from them rose to new heights. After a moderate
rise from 94 in 1923 to 114 in 1924, the Dow Jones index of indus-
trial stock prices jumped to 154 in 1925 (December average).
The slight recession in 1926, to 149, merely interrupted the vigorous
rise which brought the December 1927 average to 197.99 and the
1928 average to 281. Though the index fell to 247 in December
1929, the average for the year was 311. The movement of Standard
2For1922 and 1923, but not for the subsequent years, the law provided that
the total tax, including the tax on capital gains, of an individual electing the
fiat tax of 12½ percent in lieu of the normal and surtax rates, had to be at
least 12½ percent of his total net income.160 CHAPTER6
Chart25
EffectiveTax Rate on First Additional Dollar
of Ordinary Income or Short Term Capital Gains
at 6 Levels of Statutory Net Income, 1917—1950
Tax rote (%)
and Poor's more comprehensive index of the prices of 90 indus-
trial, railroad, and public utility company stocks, based upon 1926
prices was roughly similar. The December average in 1923 was
67.6; in 1924, 82.4; in 1925, 101.2; in 1926, 107.1;in 1927, 138.7;
in 1928, 183.8; in 1929, 170.0; and the average for 1929 as a
whole, 206.6. Considerable speculation in urban and suburban real
estate and a large volume of speculative construction of houses,
apartment and office buildings, and hotels accompanied the stock
market boom.
From roughly $1,200 million in 1923 total net capital gains
reported by taxpayers with net incomes, including both short and
long term, rose to $1,500 million in 1924 and to $2,900 million in
1925 (Table 1). After a slight recession to $2,400 million in 1926
and a recovery to $2,900 million in 1927 they jumped to $4,800
million in 1928 and sagged a trifle to $4,700 million in 1929. In
1930 the total was again less than $1,200 million; in 1931 it was
less than $500 million, or about half the amount reported under the
'20'22'24'26 '30'32
In 1948—50, assumes a loint return.
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very much higher tax rates of 1919 and 1920; in 1932 it was the
lowest in the 30 years, $163 million; and in 1933, $553 million
(Table 1).
The Treasury Department has estimated that its net revenues from
capital gains and losses aggregated $1.5 biffion in or 41
percent of the total income tax liability of all individuals and taxable
fiduciaries. This proportion was not approached in any other period
for which figures are available (Table 90). In contrast, the Treasury
has estimated that its net revenues in the next four years would have
been some $168 'million higher had capital gains and losses been
excluded by statute from the determination of taxable income.
Did the tax treatment of capital gains and losses in the 'twenties
contribute materially to the unprecedented amounts of net gains
and of tax revenues from them?
3 MOST CAPITAL GAINS REPORTED IN 1922-33 WERE SUBJECT TO
ORDINARY INCOME TAX RATES, WHICH REACHED THE LOWEST
LEVELS SINCE 1917
We may note, first, that the greater part of capital gains reported
in 1922-3 3 did not benefit from the 12½ percent ceiling rate because
they were realized by taxpayers whose incomes from other sources
were not large enough to subject them to a tax rate of more than
12½ percent if reported as ordinary income, or by upper income
individuals who had held the assets 2 years or less. In 1922-3 3
approximately 98 percent of the aggregate net capital gains of tax-
payers with net incomes under $50,000 was reported as ordinary
income; slightly more than half of the net gains of those with net
incomes between $50,000 and $100,000; and 62 percent of the
aggregate net gains of all income groups (Table 13). In only one
of the 12 years, 1929, did as much as half of the aggregate net gains
of all income groups benefit from the 12½ percent ceiling rate (Table
13). In short, for the taxpayers who were responsible for about
three-fifths of the total capital gains reported, the tax rates that
counted in 1922-33 were those on ordinary income, not the special
12½ percent ceiling rate on capital gains.
Ordinary income tax rates were lower in 1925-31 than at any other
time since 1917 (Chart 25 and Table 87). Consequently, the tax
rates on short term capital gains were at their lowest. Those on long
term gains were in no case higher than those on short term; more-
over, they were specifically limited to a maximum of 12½ percent.
Revision of 1942, Hearings, Ways and Means Committee, p. 1637.162 CHAPTER 6
In other words, the price, in taxes, of realizing net capital gains dur-
ing the boom years of realization was the lowest in the history of
our income tax except for 1913-16.
The tax provisions ruling in 1925-31 were especially favorable to
short term capital transactions. Not only were short term net gains
taxed at substantially lower rates than before or after, but short term
net losses were fully deductible against income of any kind. For
individuals with net incomes above a figure that varied between
$16,000 and $32,000 in different years, the ceiling rate of 12½
percent on long term net capital gains was more favorable than
the effective rates on short term gains, but this advantage was
partly offset after 1923 by a corresponding limit of 12½ percent
of the loss on the deductibility of long term net losses. In addition
to making the 'tax cost' of realizing short term gains much lower
than before or after, the tax provisions gave individuals with sub-
stantial incomes a special incentive to 'take' their losses while these
were still short term, and to defer the realization of capital gains
until the assets had been held more than 2 years.
4 NONTAX FACTORS WERE OF TRANSCENDENT IMPORTANCE IN THE
BOOM OF THE 'TWENTIES
The outstandingly favorable tax laws offer such a tangible and
readily inteffigible explanation that the temptation is great to ascribe
to them the major role in the capital gains boom of the 'twen-
ties. But income tax figures and collateral data indicate that they
accounted for only a part, and perhaps a small part, of the behavior
of investors and speculators. We know that the boom did not begin
as soon as tax rates were reduced, and that the favorable tax treat-
ment did not prevent a drastic decline in capital gains in 1930-33.
Many factors contributed during the 'twenties to raise the prices
of capital assets and to swell the volume of capital transactions and
of realized capital gains. The period was one of enormous business
expansion. The Federal Reserve Board index of industrial produc-
tion rose from 67 in 1921 to 119 in 1929, or 78 percent. Bank
deposits rose $18 billion, or about 50 percent. The underlying busi-
ness situation received powerful support from such forces as house
construction expenditures aggregating $34 billion (as against $8
billion in 1930-38); public utility and railroad construction of $20
billion (as against $11 billion in 1930-38); commercial and miscel-
laneous building of $20 billion (as against $13 billion in 1930-38);
consumer credit expansion of $6 billion (as against a contraction ofCHANGING TAXES AND INVESTORS' BEHAVIOR163
$1 billion in 1930-38); and American loans to foreigners of $5 bil-
lion (as against $2 biffion in
The period was also one of rising corporate profits, numerous
corporate mergers, and of generally declining interest rates. All three
influences operated to raise the market values of capital assets: the
first by increasing the income obtainable from corporate securities;
the second by promising both a reduction in risks and an increase
in income; and the third by giving each dollar of income a higher
capital value. Corporate net income reported for income tax pur-
poses rose from $4.3 billion in 1921 to $9.6 biffion in 1925, $10.6
billion in 1928, and $11.7 billion in 1929. Moody's average of Aaa
corporate bond yields was 5.97 percent in 1921, 4.88 percent in
1925, 4.55 percent in 1928, and 4.73 percent in 1929. And on top
of the increases in value due directly to these influences, further
increases occurred as speculators attempted to discount the con-
tinuation of the favorable trends. The middle 'twenties saw a wide-
spread wave of speculation in urban real estate; the later 'twenties,
unparalleled speculation in the stock market.
Unprecedented activity by speculative pools gave an extraor-
dinary stimulus to stock speculation in the second half of the
'twenties. Unhampered by the restrictions imposed by the Securities
and Exchange Commission legislation of 1933-34 many such pools
were formed and conducted with the aid of corporate managements
and of large holders of the stocks involved. Operating on a big scale,
they provided organized leadership and attracted large followings.
The market value of sponsored stocks not uncommonly rose 50
to 100 percent in a few months. New issues of securities, often of
holding companies in the electric light and power industry, were fre-
quently made the vehicles for spectacular speculative operations led
by the sponsoring investment bankers. Many members of the upper
income groups whose capital gains were usually derived from long
term investments became participants in short term speculative
operations through their relations with pool leaders and investment
bankers.
Other influences also contributed to the rise. Attracted by the
price behavior and the prospects of American securities, foreigners
bought substantial amounts. More foreign funds supported the rise
in American stocks by being lent in the call money market. Bank
credit for stock speculation was abundant and margin requirements
'Lauchlin Currie, testimony before the Temporary National Economic Com-
mittee, Hearings, IX, 4010-11.164 CHAPTER 6
low, for besides foreign funds, the call loan market benefited from
large amounts of the new capital raised through stock issues by
domestic corporations and temporarily placed in the call market
through New York banks.
And active throughout as both cause and effect in the tremendous
rise of capital values during the middle and late 'twenties was the
pervading speculative temper of the time. o
That these nontax factors were at work does not prove that the
low level of taxes on capital gains was of no influence in determining
the amounts realized during the 'twenties; even the speculative tem-
per doubtless owed something to the low taxes. The favorable tax
situation may reasonably be supposed to have made some specula-
tive and investment operations attractive that would not have been
undertaken in the face of higher tax rates, and to have encouraged
more realization than would otherwise have occurred. The favora-
ble tax rates were doubtless most influential in the uppermost income
groups. Those who had large incomes from other sources and those
whose potential capital gains, if realized, were alone of sufficient size
to place them in the topmost income groups would naturally be
expected to be most sensitive to the character of the tax treatment
of their capital gains. In 1922-29 capital gains contributed 62 per-
cent of net income for individuals with net incomes of $1 million or
more, 51 percent for those with net incomes of $500,000-1,000,000,
46 percent for those with net incomes of $300,000-500,000, 34 per-
cent for those with net inconies of $ 100,000-300,000, and 11 percent
for all income groups (Tables 2 and 41). While these figures reflect
other and more fundamental forces as well as taxation, they show
that the tax treatment in the 'twenties was sufficiently favorable to
the upper income groups to be accompanied by the realization of
gains on an enormous scale by members of these groups.
The low tax cost of short term gains at all income levels and the
full deductibility of short term losses probably encouraged more
short term trading than would otherwise have taken place. Other
conditions also were peculiarly favorable to short term speculation,
as we have seen, and, even in the face of materially higher taxes,
these might well have produced a very large proportion of the specu-
lative activity that actually occurred. Very much higher tax rates on
both short and long term gains did not prevent net capital gains of
a billion dollars a year in 1919 and 1920, when other conditions
were favorable.
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vert their unrealized short term losses into realized ones as offsets
against their taxable income, the figures do not indicate that this
expedient was resorted to extensively —presumablyfor the very
good reason that the trend of the market until 1929 was largely
upward, making net gains more common than net losses.5 From
1926 through 1929 individuals with net incomes of $50,000 or
over reported aggregate long term net capital gains of $6.1 billion
and aggregate short term net gains of $2.5 billion (Table 9). In
contrast, their aggregate short term net losses, while nearly 3 times
their long tenn net losses, were only $.4 billion, more than two-
thirds of which was sustained in 1929, the year of the stock market
crash (Table 9). Since the general run of long-held capital assets
had appreciated markedly in value during the boom, short-held assets
would naturally be expected to constitute the chief source of capital
losses even if short and long term losses had been equally deductible
for the income tax.
Nontax influences for the rising proportion of long term gains
in total gains as we ascend the income scale may be reflected in the
figures for 1925-3 1. The effective rate on additional short term gains,
as on long, was exactly the same for all incomes of $100,000 or
over. Hence, beginning at this income level those with bigger incomes
had no more incentive, as far as the ratewasconcerned, to prefer
long to short term gains than those with smaller incomes. Neverthe-
less, long term gains constituted a progressively larger proportion
of the total in this period as in others as we go from incomes of
$ 100,000-300,000 to $300,000-500,000, to $500,000-$1 million,
and to $1 million or more (Table 13).
To the extent that those with bigger incomes tended to realize
bigger average gains than those with smaller, however, the same tax
ratewouldsubject them to a larger absolute tax and might there-
fore deter them more than those with smaller incomes from realizing
their potential gains: the same tax rate, 24 percent, on a short term
capital gain and 12½ percent on a long, would take twice as many
dollars out of a $200,000 gain as out of a $100,000.
5 DID THE 12½ PERCENT RATE ON LONG TERM GAINS OF THE UPPER
INCOME GROUPS OBSTRUCT THE LIQUIDATION OF SECURITIES IN
THE 1928-29 BOOM?
Curiously enough, the maximum rate of 12½ percent, inaugurated
in 1922 as a stimulus to transfers of capital assets, was widely
Since the tabulated figures are those of net gains and losses reported, they
do not show losses that were less than the gains realized by a taxpayer.166 CHAPTER 6
charged in 1928 and 1929 with obstructing the liquidation of securi-
ties, and with thereby creating an artificial scarcity of stocks and
artificially high stock prices. No doubt the rate seemed higher after
1925 than it had in 1921. because the rates on ordinary income had
been so drastically reduced meanwhile: for a married individual
with two dependents the maximum effective rate on an additional
dollar of income had been cut from 73 percent in 1921 and 58
percentin 1922 to 25 percent by 1925. The ceiling tax rate for capi-
tal gains was therefore less of a 'bargain' rate after 1924 than it had
been before. Nevertheless, it was only ha]! the rate on additional
ordinary income for individuals with net incomes of $100,000 or
more (Table 87).
But for the many investors who lacked strong opinions respecting
the probable trend of prices for one or more of their assets, even a
moderate tax on capital gains could doubtless deter liquidation.
Such an investor had to consider that if he sold, he not only gave
up the chance of benefiting from a possible rise in the value of the
asset but faced a certain loss of capital resources and earning power
through paying the tax. If he contemplated shifting his funds to what
seemed a more attractive investment, the tax on his accrued gains
would rationally deter him unless the contemplated new commit-
ment seemed sufficiently more attractive than the old to offset the
certain loss of capital funds entailed by the transfer. To these influ-
ences must be added the consideration that although the 12½ per-
cent ceiling rate on capital gains was only half the rate on ordinary
income, it represented a considerable sum of money when gains
were large. And this rate had to be compared not only with the rate
on ordinary income but also with the zero rate open to those who
kept their property until death or gave it to relatives and others who
did not sell it.
Against the contention that the 12½ percent rate prevented a
substantial amount of liquidation is the unprecedented volume of
stock market sales in the boom years. Between January 1925 and
July 1929 the average number of shares listed on the New York
Stock Exchange more than doubled; yet the average number of
shares sold monthly increased from 7.9percentof the total in
January 1926 to 8.7 and 14.2 percent respectively in January 1928
and 1929.° Such a volume of sales might be reconciled with a small
volume of real liquidation if the sales represented primarily an enor-
upon tables in the monthly issues of the New York Stock Exchange
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mous turnover in a small fraction of the securities outstanding. But
the evidence indicates that a very considerable diffusion of stock
ownership took place. Berle and Means estimate that the number
of stockholders in three of the largest American corporations, the
American Telephone and Telegraph Company, the Pennsylvania
Railroad, and the United States Steel Corporation, increased 237,
47, and 26 percent, respectively, between 1920 and In a
series of estimates of the number of stockholders of American
corporations, excluding duplicate names, the midpoint of the esti-
mates in 1927 is 5.5miffion;in 1929, 8 million —anincrease of 45
percent.8Total net gains realized by individuals with net incomes
through the sale of securities and other capital assets during the 3
years 1927-29 exceeded the aggregate reported during the preceding
decade.
Finally, the point needs emphasis that even if a lower rate or the
complete tax exemption of long term capital gains might have led
to substantially larger sales of stocks by certain individuals, these
additional sales would not have exerted a moderating influence upon
the general level of prices in the stock market unless the sellers had
refrained from investing the proceeds in other stocks. Only if, in their
judgment, the general outlook had become clouded or adverse would
we expect a large number of sellers to liquidate particular securities
without reinvesting in others. But if they thought the outlook had
indeed become clouded or worse, the 12½ percent maximum rate
on capital gains would not, rationally, act as a serious deterrent to
selling. Since the tax applied to their net gains alone, not to the gross
sales price, an expected decline of substantially less than 12½ per-
cent in the market value of their stocks would more than justify the
'tax cost' of seffing in the case of stockholders who were actually
considering liquidation.
6 STRONG EVIDENCE THAT THE UNUSUALLY HIGH TAX RATES ON
MEDIUM TERM GAINS OF UPPER BRACKET INCOMES AND THE
LARGE DISCOUNTS OFFERED FOR CONTINUED HOLDING IN 1934-37
POSTPONED LIQUIDATION
The preferential tax treatment of capital gains took a new form in
1934. The flat 12½ percent ceiling rate on long term gains and
losses, which had been effective for the upper income groups alone,
was eliminated. Instead, for all taxpayers 70 percent of the capital
TheModern Corporation and Private Property (Macmillan, 1933), p. 56.
8N. R. Danielian, The Securities Markets (Twentieth Century Fund, 1935),
p. 50.168 CHAPTER6
gains realized on assets held longer than 10 years was excluded from
taxable income; 60 percent, if the assets had been held 5-10 years;
40 percent, if held 2-5 years; and 20 percent, if held 1-2 years. The
remainder of the gains on assets held longer than 1 year, and the
entire amount in the case of assets held 1 year or less, were 'made
subject to the full scale of normal and surtax rates applicable to
ordinary income. The same proportions of capital losses, similarly
varying with the number of years the assets had been held, were
excluded in calculating taxable income, except that a maximum of
$2,000 net capital losses so computed was allowed as a deduction
from ordinary income.
This new treatment caused the effective tax rates on capital gains
to vary with the size of income throughout the income tax scale and
with statutory changes in the exemptions, credits, and rates applica-
ble to ordinary income. In general, the new treatment lowered the
effective tax rates on the capital gains of individuals with small or
moderately large incomes, but raised them on those with upper
bracket incomes. The dividing line varied with the holding period.
All income groups benefited from the treatment accorded gains from
assets held 1-2 years because such gains had previously been taxed
as ordinary income. On gains from assets held 2-5 years, the effec-
tive rates were raised for taxpayers whose surtax incomes, exclu-
sive of the contemplated gains, exceeded about $22,000, and low-
ered for others; if the assets had been held 5-10 years, the dividing
line was about $50,000; and if longer than 10 years, about $68,000.
The increases were especially sharp on gains from assets held 2-5
years realized by taxpayers with incomes approaching or exceeding
$100,000, because the exclusion of 40 percent of the gain from
taxation still left the effective rates in this part of the income scale
far above the previous 12½ percent maximum. A taxpayer whose
surtax net income from other sources was $50,000 in 1934 and who
contemplated realizing a capital gain of $100,000 from an asset held
2-5 years faced a tax of $27,900, or 27.9 percent on his capital
gain. If his surtax net income from other sources was $100,000, he
faced an effective tax rate of 33.7 percent on his gain. (An upward
adjustment in the surtax schedule raised these rates somewhat in
193 6-37.) For all except the top income groups, the exclusion from
taxable income of 60 and 70 percent of the gains from longer
holding periods was enough to bring the effective rates either be-
low or only moderately above those previously prevailing. If the
$100,000 capital gain contemplated by the taxpayer in the lastCHANGING TAXES AND INVESTORS' BEHAVIOR169
example was from an asset held more than 10 years instead of 2-5
years, the tax on the gain would be 16.8 instead of 33.7 percent.
The substantial tax cost of realizing a medium term capital gain
when the addition to the taxpayer's ordinary income would put him
in an upper income.group can well be supposed to have dissuaded
many persons from realizing such gains during this period. Accen-
tuating the deterrent influence of the high tax rates were the direct
incentives for postponement provided in the law. Prior to 193 4-37
two years and a day was the only period of holding required to
qualify a capital gain for the most preferential tax treatment. In
1934-37, however, the law offered the equivalent of a series of suc-
cessively larger discounts from the tax rates on ordinary income for
postponing realization of gains. In effect, those from assets held
more than 10 years were given a discount of 70 percent and those
from shorter periods of holding, discounts of 60, 40, or 20 percent,
according as the asset had been held 5-10, 2-5, or 1-2 years, respec-
tively.
Although these discounts were uniform for all income levels, their
value was small at the lower levels because the ordinary income tax
rates were low; and their value rose with income because of the
progression of income tax rates. If a man with $5,000 income kept
his asset more than 10 years instead of 1 year or less, he would
reduce the effective tax rate on the first dollar of his gain only from
4 to 1.2 percent; but for a man with $100,000 income, the rate
would be reduced from 54 to 16.2 percent, and for one with $1
million income, from 62 to 18.6 percent.9 The stepdowns in the
rates in the intervening periods were similarly progressive. The effec-
tive tax rate on the first dollar of capital gains was reduced by the
following percentage points for the indicated amounts of income for
holding an asset over 1 year, over 2 years, over 5 years, and over
10 years, respectively: for an income of $1 million, 12.4, 24.8, 37.2,
and 43.4; for $100,000, 10.8, 21.6, 32.4, and 37.8; for $50,000,
6.2, 12.4, 18.6, and 21.7; for $25,000, 3.8, 7.6, 11.4, and 13.3;
for $10,000, 1.8, 3.6, 5.4, and 6.3; for $5,000, .8, 1.6, 2.4, and 2.8.
The combined effect of the foregoing influences upon individuals
with large incomes from ordinary sources or large amounts of
medium term capital gains was a powerful inducement to defer real-
ization for a longer period than under the two-year rule of 1921-33.
And adding to this inducement was the hope that Congress might
In 1934-35. The rates were somewhat higher and the margins slightly different
in 1936-37; see Table 87.170 CHAPTER 6
be persuaded soon to reduce the effective rates on capital gains
by reimposing a low ceiling rate or other means.
The operations and fortunes of investors are ordinarily the joint
products of so many conificting influences that clear evidence of the
effects of tax factors upon their conduct cannot always be found in
Statistics of income. In the present instance, as in a few others, how-
ever, such evidence appears to exist. When a maximum tax of 15
percent on gains from assets held more than 2 years was substituted
in 1938 for the rates prevailing in the preceding 4 years, the aggre-
gate net capital gains of individuals with incomes of $100,000 or
over jumped 144 percent —from$135 million in 1937 to $328 mil-
lion in 1938 —eventhough the net gains of all other income groups
fell $192 miffion, or 28 percent (Table 2).b0 The inference is rea-
sonable that many seffing transactions previously held up by the
substantial tax rates imposed on the gains of upper bracket individ-
uals were rushed through in 1938 when a ceiling rate of 15 percent
was substituted.1' This inference is supported by the behavior of
net capital gains in the following year, when the amount reported by
individuals with net incomes of $100,000 or over fell off nearly
two-thirds, while the total reported by all other taxpayers increased
somewhat.
The effect of the flat ceiling rate of 15 percent on gains from assets
held more than 2 years and of the 20 percent maximum rate on gains
from assets held 18-24 months does not appear to have been limited
to 1938.12 During the 4 years 1938-41 as a whole, the net gains of
individuals with incomes of $100,000 and more increased $371
million, or about 67 percent, over those of 1934-37, in the face of
a decline of $467 million, or about 17 percent, in the net gains re-
ported by all other income groups (Table 2). Most of this increase
'°The figures here cited only approximate the absolute and relative amounts
involved because changes in the statutes and tabulations caused the classifica-
tions for 1938-41 to differ in certain respects from those for 1934-37. A less
complete offsetting of losses against gains caused total net capital gains in
1938-41 to be somewhat overstated as compared with those in 1934-37, and
the statutory net incomes included different percentages of capital gains and
losses (see the statistical notes in Appendix One). But the movements here
noted are so pronounced and of such character that their significance is not
vitiated by these differences.
The 15 percent maximum rate applied to gains from assets held more than
2 years; the ceiling was 20 percent on gains from assets held 18-24 months.
A special Defense Tax of 10 percent of the total income tax liability as
otherwise determined, imposed in 1940, raised the effective ceiling rates on
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was accounted for by taxpayers with net incomes of $300,000 and
over, whose aggregate net gains in 1938-41 were more than twice
as large as in the preceding 4 years.
Several factors appear to account for the divergence between the
experience of the uppermost income groups and that of other tax-
payers in 1938-41 as compared with 1934-37. The conditions of
1938-41 were unfavorable for increases in capital values. The busi-
ness recession, which had become marked in the latter part of 1937,
deepened in 1938; and the shadow of World War II created grave
uncertainties for investors well before its actual outbreak in Sep-
tember 1939. Partly because of military orders from abroad and from
our own rearmament program, industrial production expanded
sharply in 1940 and 1941, but capital values as measured by stock
prices did not respond. In fact, the stock market was depressed
throughout most of the 4 years. The December average of Standard
and Poor's index of 90 stocks, which had been 135.5 in 1936 and
87.5 in 1937, was 100.7 in 1938; 98.2 in 1939; 83.7 in 1940; and
69.5 in 1941. Tax factors apart, a lower level of aggregate capital
gains in 1938-41 than in 1934-37 was to be expected from the be-
havior of the stock market.
It seems reasonable to attribute the divergence of actual results
from this expectation in the case of the uppermost income groups
to the change in tax treatment, which encouraged the realization of
accumulated capital gains previously dammed up by unfavorable tax
treatment. On the other hand, because of the lower tax rates to
which they had been subject, those who could realize capital gains
in 1934-37 without moving their total taxable incomes close to or
above the $100,000 level had been offered a much smaller incentive
to postpone realization than those with larger incomes. In conse-
quence, a relatively smaller amount of dammed-up realization was
presumably released in these income groups by the tax treatment
inaugurated in 1938.
Individuals with net incomes of less than $100,000 nevertheless
continued to account for the greater part of aggregate net capital
gains. Although their share fell from about 83 percent in 1934-3 7
to about 71 percent in 1938-41, it continued to dominate the totals
(Table 3). Hence superficial inspection of the figures would show
that the more favorable tax treatment of capital gains was accom-
panied by a reduction in the total realized. In reality, however, the
income groups most affected by the changed treatment responded
to it quite sharply in the face of adverse business conditions, while172 CHAPTER 6
the other income groups, dominating the aggregate, did not respond,
because the change for them was relatively small and was over-
shadowed by the other conditions affecting capital values.
Finally, the movement of some individuals into higher income
groups through large-scale realization of capital gains doubtless con-
tributed in some degree to the divergent changes in the amounts
realized. Since the classification by incomes is based upon incomes
including the statutory proportions of capital gains taxable as
income, a taxpayer's decision to realize or postpone realizing any
substantial amount in a particular year may be the primary influence
in determining the income group in which he is counted in the pub-
lished statistics for that year. The big increase in the capital gains
reported by the uppermost income groups in 1938-41 was swelled
by the gains of some taxpayers who reached a high income level in
this period solely or primarily because they realized previously de-
ferred capital gains. If, for example, a man with a surtax net income
of $50,000 from ordinary sources in any of the years 1934-37 post-
poned realizing a capital gain of $300,000 on an asset held 2-5years
in order to avoid the substantial tax rates in force, then realized the
gain in 1938, he would be in the $50,000 income group in 1934-37
and in the $200,000 income group in 1938 ($50,000 of ordinary
income and 50 percent of the $300,000 capital gain).
7SHARPADVANCE IN TAX RATES SINCE 1942 ACCOMPANIED BY SUB-
STANTIAL INCREASES IN REALIZED CAPITAL GAINS
The large expenditures for rearmament preceding our entrance into
World War II led to sharp increases in income tax rates, and even
sharper advances were made in the Revenue Act of 1942, following
the United States declaration of war. Between 1939 and 1942 the
exemption for a head of a family was reduced from $2,500 to $1,200
and that for a single individual from $1,000 to $500. The normal
tax rate was raised from 4 to 6 percent, the initial surtax rate from
4to13 percent, the exemption from surtax of the first $4,000 of
surtax net income was eliminated, other surtax rates were substan-
tially advanced, and a new maximum surtax rate of 82 percent was
made applicable to surtax net incomes over $200,000 instead of over
$5miffion.The combined effect of these changes is indicated by the
rise in the effective tax rate on an additional dollar of income at
various income levels. For a $5,000 a year married man with 2
children,'the effective rate on an additional dollar of ordinary income
rose from 4 to 22 percent; for one with $10,000 income, from 9 toCHANGING TAXES AND INVESTORS' BEHAVIOR173
34 percent; $25,000, 19 to 58 percent; $50,000, 31 to 69 percent;
$100,000, 59 to 83 percent; $1 million, 76 to 88 percent (Chart 25
and Table 87). For 1943 these rates were increased by the imposi-
tion of a special 5percentVictory Tax with lower exemptions,
credits, and deductions than usual, and were further increased in
1944 by several percentage points in most income brackets.
Because the maximum tax rates on capital gains remained un-
changed in 1940, except for the Defense Tax cited in note 12, and
1941 in the face of the higher levies on ordinary income, the disparity
of tax treatment for individuals with large incomes became wider
than ever (Table 88). But the Revenue Act of 1942 imposed heavier
taxes on capital gains and reduced the allowances for capital losses.
The maximum effective rate on a long term capital gain, which had
been 20 percent if the asset had been held 18-24 months, and 15
percent if held longer, was raised to 25 percent on all long term capi-
tal gains; In 1938-39 persons with surtax net incomes smaller than
about $44,000 had been subject to rates lower than the 20 and 15
percent ceilings on long term gains; now, only those with surtax net
incomes less than $18,000 were subject to effective tax rates on such
gains lower than 25 percent. The special treatment of long term capi-
tal gains was achieved in substantially the same manner as previ-
ously: only half of such gains was included in taxable income, and
the taxed half could be reported on a separate schedule subject to
a flat 50 percent tax rate if inclusion in ordinary income would result
in a rate higher than 50 percent.
For the previous unlimited deductibility of the statutory amounfs
of net long term capital losses from ordinary income there was sub-
stituted a maximum allowance of $1,000 in any one year, but the
taxpayer was given the privilege of carrying forward the remainder
of a net capital loss for 5years,applying it to offset capital gains
during this period to the full amount of the carry-over and to offset
ordinary income up to $1,000 in each year.
These steps in the direction of more stringency were partly offset
by a major concession respecting the holding period necessary to
qualify a gain for preferential treatment. In response to strong rep-
resentations that the realization of many bona fide capital gains is
obstructed when a long holding period is required, Congress reduced
this period to the shortest ever required, 6 months. A concession was
made with respect to short term losses also. Previously these could be
offset only against short term gains. Now they were combined with
long term losses and could be used to offset short or long term gains,174 CHAPTER 6
and to reduce other taxable income up to $1,000; and, as indicated
above, the balance of any combined short and long term net loss
could be carried forward for 5years.Because only half of long term
gains but the full amount of short term losses were taken into
account, each dollar of short term loss offset the tax liability on $2
of long term gains.
Despite these concessions, the 1942 changes in tax treatment
brought the effective tax rates on capital gains to the highest levels
since 1921, with the exception, previously discussed, of a few cate-
gories of gains of the top income groups in 1934-37 (Chart 24 and
Table 87). Nevertheless, the changes were followed by large in-
creases in realized capital gains. The average annual amount in
1942-46 for returns with net incomes, $3.4 billion, was more than
quadruple that of 1938-41, 1934-37, or 1917-21, and was about
71 percent in excess of 1922-3 3. Nor was the sharp rise in realized
gains confined to the middle and lower income groups. Individuals
with net incomes of $100,000 or over almost tripled their average
annual capital gains over 1938-41.
These figures indicate that severer taxation did not prevent a con-
siderable volume of gains-taking. On the other hand, they do not
demonstrate that the higher taxes did not discourage some sales of
capital assets. Obscuring the inhibiting effects of the higher rates,
and perhaps offsetting them in part, was the stimulus to capital gains
arising from the war-created expansion in business activity and in
national income. As estimated by the Department of Commerce,
national income rose from an average of $81.3 biffion a year in
1938-41 to $170.7 billion in 1942-46. The amount of capital gains
reported wasalsoincreased, it is probable, by the wider use of legal
arrangements designed to convert ordinary income into capital gains.
The extraordinarily high tax rates on ordinary income were a strong
stimulus to many taxpayers to devise and use such expedients. One
device, referred to later in this chapter, was the sale or liquidation of
a corporation possessing large undistributed earnings rather than the
distribution of these earnings in dividends. Another was the incor-
poration of a separate company for each of a series of ventures that
would ordinarily be undertaken by a single enterprise, and the sale
or liquidation of each company, after 6 months or more, as its sep-
arate venture was completed. These and other devices to convert
ordinary income into capital gains will receive further attention in
Chapter 9.
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to 6 months and a day of the period an asset had to be held in order
to qualify a gain from it as 'long term'. With so brief a period of
ownership needed to obtain the benefit of tax rates only half or less
of the rates applicable to ordinary income, many investors were
doubtless induced to make some commitments they would not
otherwise have made, and to take their gains sooner. We cannot
measure the results of this influence, but the relatively narrow range
of stock market fluctuations and the low to moderate volume of
stock trading during most of this period suggest that they were not
large. The number of shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange
in 1946 was only about a third that of 1929. We have previously
noted the close relation between short term gains and losses and
fluctuations in stock prices, and between the former and the volume
of stock trading (Charts 17 and 18; Tables 8 and 15).
Despite the substantial capital gains reported in 1942-46, it is
probable that restraining influences were at work. The level and the
recent rate of increase of national income favored larger amounts.
Although national income in 1946 was more than twice that of 1929,
net capital gains realized were only 1.5 times as large ($7.3 vs. $4.8
billion). Doubtless many factors conspired to produce this difer-
ence. Stock prices did not advance violently in 1942-46 as they
had in 1927-29. Between January 1927 and September 1929 they
jumped from 103.1 to 340.6 percent of 1926 prices, as measured
by Standard and Poor's Corporation, while between 1942 and 1944
they rose only from 70.9 to 100.0, then to an average of 137.6 in
December 1945 and to an average of 148.5 in May 1946. The uncer-
tainties created by World War II, together with the increase in
taxes on corporation income and the possibly adverse effects upon
corporate earnings of renegotiations of war contracts, probably
impeded the advance of capital values. And with memories of the
Great Depression of the 'thirties still vivid, the whole tenor of the
times was different from that of the late 'twenties. Among the many
forces that restricted the realization of capital gains, the severer tax
treatment probably played some part.
8 IS THE ABSOLUTE OR THE RELATIVE LEVEL OF CAPITAL GAINS
TAXES MORE SIGNIFICANT?
In the opinion of some students the extraordinarily wide gap be-
tween the rates on capital gains and the rates on ordinary income
in 1942-49 diminished the deterrent influence of the former, thereby176 CHAPTER 6
tending to bring about more realization of gains.'3 As against the
25 percent ceiling on long term capital gains, the bracket rates on
ordinary income reached as high as 94 percent for amounts in excess
of $200,000. Though relatively to the latter, the capital gains rate
seemed low, its absolute level was twice as high as the 12½ percent
maximum prevailing during the stock market boom of the 1920's
and that had been widely charged with contributing to the inflation
of stock prices by deterring stockholders from selling their securities.
The highest surtax rate during the late 'twenties, applicable to all
surtax net income over $100,000, was 20 percent, in comparison
with which the capital gains rate of 12½ percent doubtless seemed
substantial. Could a capital gains tax rate twice as high, when coupled
with very much higher rates on ordinary income, exert a smaller
deterrent influence or a positively encouraging one upon sales of
capital assets? We may note several ways in which this was possible:
First, there can be little doubt that the 25 percent capital gains tax
now looked low relative to the rates on ordinary income. It was
therefore a smaller psychological obstacle to sales than its absolute
level might suggest. Because it was widely regarded as a 'bargain
rate',14 it probably gave some investors a positive stimulus to 'take'
capital gains.
Second, the wide discrepancy speeded some sales of capital assets
by creating the fear that Congress might soon reduce the degree of
preference accorded capital gains or remove the preference alto-
Third, the very high rates on ordinary income made it prohibitively
costly for wealthy individuals to receive previously accumulated
corporate earnings in dividends from corporations they controlled,
whereas the sale of their stock would enable them to obtain these
previously accumulated earnings (to the extent that they were
reflected in the price of the stock) plus any other capital gains
subject only to the 25 percent rate. For example, suppose the owner
of substantially all the capital stock of a textile mill, who was in the
80 percent tax bracket, desired to obtain for his personal disposition
several hundred thousand dollars of the company's previously ac-
cumulated earnings. If he paid these earnings to himself in dividends
he could keep only 20 percent of them after taxes. On the other hand,
See remarks by George 0. May, Thomas N. Tarleau, Eustace Seligman,
Harry J. Rudick, and Lawrence H. Seltzer, in Capital Gains Taxation, pp. 54-8.
"Cf. J. K. Lasser, YOur Income Tax (Simon and Schuster, 1944), p. 137.
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if he seized a current opportunity to sell all or a part of his stock at
a price per share equaling or exceeding the sum of his original cost
and the reinvested earnings, he would have, after taxes, his original
cost plus 75 percent of the reinvested earnings plus 75 percent of any
additional payment made by the purchaser. Obviously this motive
for seffing would not exist if capital gains were subject to the same
high tax rates as dividends. Even if they were taxable at moderately
lower rates, the inducement to sell might well prove insufficient
because the remaining advantage of the capital gains over the ordi-
nary tax rate would have to be weighed against the disadvantages
of relinquishing part or all of the ownership of the enterprise.
Fourth, the relative levels of the rates on ordinary income and on
capital gains favored the sale by wealthy men of assets yielding large
incomes but subject to heavy burdens of management or risk. Sup-
pose, for example, the owner in the preceding example received a
net income of $60,000 a year from his mill and net income from
other sources of $40,000. At the 1944 rates, his total net income,
$100,000, would be subject to a tax of $68,565.'° If his income
from the mill were eliminated, his tax would be cut to $19,545.
Hence he might reasonably attribute $49,020 of his total tax to his
income from the mill, leaving him only $10,980 from the latter
after taxes. If he expected such high taxes to persist, he might rea-
sonably decide to relieve himself of the managerial and risk burdens
of his business even at the cost of a substantial reduction in his
pre-tax income. By transferring his funds to safer and less exacting
but lower yielding uses and by forfeiting part of his capital by paying
the 25 percent tax on the capital gains he realizes in the transfer, he
might sacrifice half of this part of his income. Most of the loss,
however, would be borne by the government because of the accom-
panying reduction in his personal income tax. For example, assum-
ing that the cost basis of the mill to him was $200,000 and that he
sold it for receiving $100,000 in cash and $500,000 in
6 percent mortgage bonds, he would have to pay a capital gains tax
of $100,000, and his income from the mill would be cut in half, to
$30,000. But the income tax on his total net income, $70,000, would
now be only $42,645, a $25,920 reduction from the amount payable
on $100,000 net income. In other words, the $30,000 decrease in
his net income would cut his income taxes $25,920. After taxes,
therefore, his net income would be reduced only $4,080 a year. He
he was entitled to four exemptions (himself, his wife, and two
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might well consider such a reduction a small price to pay for his
relief from the exertions and risks of owning and operating his
business.
A capital gains tax rate of 25 percent should rationally exert a
smaller deterrent influence upon the realization of gains when the
effective tax rate on marginal amounts of ordinary income is 80
percent than when it is lower, say 50 percent, because the loss of
principal through payment of the capital gains tax entails a smaller
loss of income, after income taxes, in the former case than in the
latter. If the effective ordinary rate was 80 percent, an investor whose
unrealized capital gains of $100,000 are yielding him a pre-tax
income of $10,000 and an after-tax income of $2,000 will lose only
$500 a year in after-tax income by realizing his gains, paying 25
percent of them in taxes and reinvesting the balance at the same
yield as before. With the same 25 percent capital gains tax rate, he
would lose $1,250 a year in after-tax income if the effective rate on
the relevant amounts of his ordinary income is 50 instead of 80
percent. 17
Onthe other hand, if the wartime, high levels of income tax rates
were coupled with an effective tax rate on capital gains of 50 or
75 percent, shifts of investments that entailed the realization of large
capital gains would doubtless be greatly discouraged. Even though
high income investors could derive only a small yield, after income
taxes, from their capital funds, they would be loath to pay capital
gains taxes that made substantial inroads on their principal when
they could avoid these taxes merely by not selling. As was the case
in 1917-21, large numbers of them would postpone sales in the hope
or expectation that tax rates on both ordinary incomes and on capital
gains would not be held at high levels indefinitely, or in the expecta-
tion that their properties would be freed from all potential tax
liability on the capital gains embodied in them by transfer at death.
For these reasons, even the 25 percent rate probably deterred many
sales in which large absolute amounts of gains would have been
realized.
Finally, although the high tax rates on ordinary incomes rationally
favored the realization of gains by some investors in connection with
the shifting of their funds from more to less hazardous or exacting
uses, they at the same time exerted an opposite influence. They dis-
couraged transfers of funds, and the incidental realization of gains,
in the search for higher yields. If a man in the 80 percent bracket
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sees a chance to double his pre-tax yield of 10 percent by selling a
property in which he has a large unrealized gain and buying another,
he is confronted by the fact that the 10 percent differential in yield
will be reduced to 2 percent by the income tax, and will be reduced
further by the payment of the 25 percent capital gains tax. Under
these circumstances the incentive to transfer funds from less to more
remunerative employments, and the incidental realization of capital
gains in the process, is greatly impaired.
On the whole, the figures for 1942-46 appear to be a reasonable
reflection of the criss-cross influences operating upon investors dur-
ing this period. Average annual capital gains were substantially
higher than in any other period of uniform tax treatment. Although
individuals with net incomes of $100,000 or over realized materially
larger average annual capital gains than in the preceding period,
the percentage increase in amount of gain was only somewhat
more than half that of the other income groups. Their capital gains
represented 33.9 percent of their total net income in 1942-46; they
had been 27.6 percent in 1938-41, 18.2 percent in 1934-37, 41.8
percent in 1922-33, and 4.2 percent in 1917-21.
Summary
Some of the broader conclusions suggested by the evidence re-
viewed in this chapter are:
1) The disposition of the top income groups to realize or to
defer taking capital gains has been clearly and markedly sensitive
to the tax treatment.
2) The degree of responsiveness of the middle and lower income
groups is less clearly revealed by the figures because the tax rates
applicable to their long term gains have generally been substantially
lower and have moved, for the most part, within a narrower absolute
range (Table 87). The rate on the first dollar of long term capital
gains for a $5,000 a year married man with two children, for exam-
ple, was 7 percent in 1918, .5 percent in 1929, 2.4 percent in 1937,18
and 11 percent in 1943; whereas the rate for a man with an income of
$100,000 was 64 percent in 1918, 12.5 percent in 1929, 35.4 per-
cent in 1937,18 and 25 percent in 1943. Even after allowing for
these differences in level and range, however, the responsiveness of
the lower and middle income groups seems to have been less than
that of the top income groups. Perhaps the smaller average gain and
18Jfthe asset had been held 2-5years..180 CHAPTER 6
the smaller absolute amount of capital gains taxes involved con-
tributed, among other factors, to this result.
3) The figures for taxpayers as a whole have shown a much less
consistent response to the changing tax treatments than those for the
uppermost income groups because, among other reasons, they have
most commonly been dominated by the lower and middle income
groups. Individuals with net incomes under $25,000 accounted for
37 percent of aggregate net capital gains in 1922-33, 58percentin
1934-37, 52percentin 1938-41, and 62 percent in 1942-46; and
those with net incomes under $50,000 accounted for 49, 72, 62 and
73 percent, respectively (Table 3).
4) The major influence upon aggregate capital gains realized
annually has been neither the tax treatment nor the general level of
prosperity as measured by national income. It has been, rather, the
extent of changes in the prices and turnover of capital assets, notably
common stocks. Total capital gains have varied widely in periods of
uniform tax treatment and have not always responded even in
direction to the influence of more or less leniency in tax treatment.
Nor have they varied consistently even in direction with fluctuations
in national income (for example, 1933-34, 1936-37, 1938-39,
1941-42). The much higher level of national income in 1942-46
as compared with that of 1929 was accompanied by a less than
proportional increase in capital gains. Changes in taxation, not
only on capital gains but also on individual and corporate income
and on gifts and estates, and changes in national income are doubt-
less elements in the complex of forces that determine the price
movements and trading in capital assets. But less tangible factors,
such as the speculative temper of the times, the domestic and inter-
national political atmosphere, and governmental policies sometimes
play more immediately important roles.